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POLICE CONTROLS OVER CITIZEN USE OF THE PUBLIC STREETS
JIM THOMPSON
This Comment will examine the operation and
validity of several types of laws, most often passed
by municipal legislatures, which regulate the
citizen's use of the public streets. To be considered,
also, is the often asserted "right" of the police to
stop and question persons on the street in the
absence of circumstances justifying arrest and
detention.
In varying degrees, many municipalities have on
the books curfew,' loitering,' dress,3 and associa-
tion 4 laws. The penalties attached to the violation
I A typical curfew is that of Evanston, Illinois which
provides that it is unlawful for persons under 16 to
be on any public street between the hours of 10:00
P.M. and 6:00 A.M. unless accompanied by and in
charge of a parent, guardian or other proper companion
of the age of 21 years or more, or engaged in any occu-
pation or business which may be lawfully engaged in
under state statutes.
2 E.g., No person shall lounge, idle or loiter on any
public street or way. A variation on this type of or-
dinance is the "wandering" law, apparently coming
between a curfew and loitering law. This type commonly
prohibits wandering or strolling aimlessly on the public
streets after certain hours.
3E.g., No person shall appear on any public street or
in any public place dressed in anything other than
customary attire.4 E.g., No person shall associate, escort, loiter, or
converse with any felon, prostitute, thief or drunkard
on any public street or in any public place.
of these laws are usually slight, and usually they
are never enforced, or at most, sporadically en-
forced, and even then only against those persons
such as juveniles and vagrants who would not be
expected to appeal from the decisions of the mag-
istrate type of court which most often has juris-
diction in these cases. It is not unusual, therefore,
that there are few cases in the reports dealing with
such laws. Nevertheless, because freedom of move-
ment, dress, and association are, no doubt, activ-
ities having constitutional implications, and be-
cause such laws have been widely enacted, it is
important that these restrictions be closely scru-
tinized.
We may first consider general principles. Un-
questionably, the citizen's personal liberty, guar-
anteed him by the various state constitutions and
the fourteenth amendment, includes the right to
"go where one pleases, and when, and to do that
which may lead to one's business or pleasure, only
so far restrained as the rights of others may make
it' necessary for the welfare of all other citizens."'
Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579
(1889). And see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958),
where Justice Douglas said "The right to travel is a
part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be de-
prived without due process of law...."
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
Equally unquestioned is the right of the state, in
the exercise of its police power, to restrict such
liberty by legislation which protects or promotes
the health or welfare of the people, subject to the
demand of due process that such legislation bear a
reasonable relation to ends which the state may
legitimately seek to achieve.6 Neither liberty nor
restraint, therefore, is absolute.
PUBLIC DRESS LAWS
Only one appellate case has been found in the
books which deals with restrictions on the type of
clothing that may be worn in public. In People v.
O'Gorman,7 the New York Court of Appeals held
unconstitutional a municipal ordinance which pro-
hibited appearance on the public street by anyone
dressed in "other than customary street attire."
The ordinance was void, said the court, because
the terms of the law were too vague to satisfy due
process and because "No man or woman is obliged
to wear the 'ordinary street attire.' People can
dress as they please, wear anything, so long as
they do not offend public order and decency.""
Other cities have similar ordinances, most often
dealing with bathing attire; their validity, how-
ever, would seem to be in doubt under the O'Gor-
man decision.9
ASSOCIATION LAWS
Laws which forbid persons to associate with
undesirable elements of society, e.g., thieves,
felons, drunkards, and prostitutes, have been uni-
formly voided by the courts. In City of St. Louis
v. Fitz,10 the court reversed a conviction under an
G See generally, FREUND, THE POLICE POWER (1904);
ROETTINGER, THE SuPREmE COURT AND STATE POLICE
POWER (1957).
7274 N.Y. 284, 8 N.E. 2d 862 (1937).
8 "The Constitution still leaves some opportunity
for people to be foolish if they so desire." 274 N.Y. at
287. Followed in People v. Savarese, 167 N.Y.S.2d 312(Magis. Ct. 1957).
'§ 192-14 of the CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE provides
that "No person shall sim or bathe in the waters of
Lake Michigan adjacent to the city... unless such
person is clothed in a suitable bathing dress." ("... with-
out a proper bathing suit.") (Evanston, Illinois.) It is
reasonable to assume that such standards as "suitable"
and "proper" are as subject to the vice of vagueness
as that of "customary" in the O'Gorman case. Illus-
trative of the fact that these laws are taken seriously
by some municipal authorities is the report in the
Chicago newspapers several years ago that a group of
German boy scouts touring Chicago in the summertime
wearing their traditional leather shorts were given an
unofficial "pass" by the Chicago Police Department to
appear on the streets in such costumes.
10 53 Mo. 582 (1873).
ordinance which forbade association with thieves
and prostitutes. The majority hinted, however,
that an ordinance might properly be drawn which
forbade knowing association with those persons,
while a concurring justice would have held such
laws to be absolutely void. The ordinance was
amended in accordance with the intimations of the
court. When a later case, City of St. Louis v.
Roche n arose, however, the court overruled the
Fitz case and held that all such laws were beyond
the constitutional power of the legislature. The
court reasoned that if the legislature could forbid
persons to associate with certain people, it might
equally be able to compel association with others
-a prospect which the court found repugnant to
individual freedom.12 The only departure from this
otherwise uniform reaction by the courts seems to
have come in People v. Pieri,3 which upheld an
ordinance forbidding association with criminals for
an unlawful purpose. Because of the heavy burden
of proof this requirement imposes on the state, it
is doubtful whether the law reaches any conduct
which an ordinary conspiracy statute might not
reach.14
THE PoLIcE RIGHT TO QUESTION "SuspIcIoUs"
PERSONS
The police generally have the authority to arrest
and detain, without warrant, (1) those persons who
11 128 Mo. 541, 31 S.W. 915 (1895).
' "We deny the power of any legislative body in
this country to choose for our citizens whom their
associates shall be." Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 223, 36
S.W. 628, 629 (1896); (Ordinance which forbade any-
one except male relative to associate, converse, escort
or loiter with any prostitute, by day or night, upon any
street is invalid), Hechinger v. City of Maysville, 22
Ky. L. Rep. 486, 57 S.W. 619 (1900); (ordinance pro-
hibiting association, walking, riding, or visiting with
prostitutes invalid as invasion of personal liberties), Ex
pare Cannon, 94 Tex. Crim. 257, 250 S.W. 429 (1923).Query whether an ordinance which forbade undesirable
elements to associate with other undesirables might be
a more reasonable exercise of the police power? § 192-6
of the CHICAGO MUIC'A CODE, for example, makes
it unlawful for drunks, prostitutes or felons to assemble
or congregate with other such persons in or upon the
public ways or other public places or to loaf or loiter in
or about or frequent the premises of any place where
intoxicating liquors are sold. In City of Grand Rapids v.
Newton, Ii Mich. 48, 69 N.W. 84 (1896), the court
voided a similar ordinance on the ground that it was
so broad as to be unreasonable.
u 269 N.Y. 315, 199 N.E. 495 (1936).
14 "Here then is the crime. If a person of bad reputa-
tion, with intent to provoke a breach of the peace,
keeps company with criminals, makes them his asso-
ciates, for an unlawful purpose, he is guilty of disorderly
conduct. Nothing unconstitutional about such a
statute." 199 N.E. at 497.
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commit a crime in the presence of the officer or,
(2) when a specific crime, which is within the
policeman's knowledge, has been committed and
there is reasonable cause for believing the arrested
person committed it.' Absent these circumstances,
do the police have a right to stop and question,
without resorting to arrest, persons going about
their business on the public streets?
16
In People v. Tinston, 7 the defendant, who had
stopped several persons on the street and talked
with them briefly, turned around and walked
quickly away when he saw the police sitting in a
car at the curb. The police, suspicious of his con-
duct and on the lookout for persons in the "num-
bers" game caught up with him and, when he
refused to identify himself, arrested him for dis-
orderly conduct. The disorderly conduct charge
was dismissed by the magistrate who declared, in
a written opinion, "This court knows of no legal
mandate obligating the citizen to reveal his identity
in circumstances such as are here related."'J In
Commonwealth v. Doe,19 a Pennsylvania court
dismissed an assault and battery charge against a
defendant who had pushed a constable out of his
way when the latter stopped him on the street for
questioning. The court held that the citizen "was
not required to remain and submit to the inquiries
of the officer.' 2° Gisske v. Sanders,2 a decision of a
California appellate court, went the other way.
Here the plaintiff was walking on the street at
night under ordinary circumstances. A policeman
answering a robbery call stopped him and asked
for his name and destination. Plaintiff refused to
give it and he was arrested. The reviewing court
reversed a jury verdict against the police for false
arrest, and held that "a police officer has a right
to make inquiry in a proper manner of anyone
upon the public streets at a late hour as to his
15 Generally, see PERKINS, ELEMENTS OF POLICE
SCIENCE (1942).
16 It might be more realistic, instead of talking
about the "right" of the police, to inquire as to the
consequences of the citizen's refusal to answer ques-
tions concerning his name, address, destination, etc.
Is his refusal grounds for arrest or is the conduct of the
police lawful only up to the point where the person
being questioned refuses any more voluntary answers?
17 163 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Magis. Ct. 1957).
18 Id. at 558.
19 167 Atl. 241 (Pa. Super. 1933).
20 Id. at 242. But see Hargus v. State, 54 P. 2d 211,
214 (Okla. Crim. 1935), (murder conviction upheld
where defendant shot and killed policeman who
stopped him on the street). "It is not unlawful for a
police officer, nor for a private citizen, to make a reason-
able inquiry of strangers or others...."
219 Cal. App. 13, 98 Pac. 43 (1908).
identity and the occasion of his presence, if the
surroundings are such as to indicate to a reasonable
man that the public safety demands such identifi-
cation."2 Dicta may be found in other cases in
support of this view."
LOITERING AND CuREiW LAWS
The ordinances examined above may reflect,
somewhat, the American penchant for disposing of
a supposed problem by passing a law.' 4 Hardly
anyone would dispute the right of the citizen
to wear what he wants, short of public inde-
cency; or to associate with whom he pleases,
when nothing illegitimate is involved. The nearly
universal invalidation by the courts of laws re-
stricting these right supports the view that the
legislatures have passed the bounds of legitimate
state interference in the affairs of the citizen in
these instances. Loitering and curfew laws, how-
ever, present much more serious problems. Here
the interest of the state may be more easily identi-
fied. Proponents of these measures find a legitimate
societal interest in laws which are ostensibly
aimed at tramps and vagrants who prowl the
streets at night; sex perverts who idle near schools,
playgrounds and public toilets; juvenile gangs
which, in our modern society, having money and
cars at their disposal and seemingly free of parental
control, account for half of the major crimes com-
22."The fact that crimes had recently been com-
mitted in that neighborhood, that plaintiff in a late
hour was found in the locality, that he refused to
answer proper questions establishing his identity, were
circumstances which should lead a reasonable officer to
require his presence at the station.... ." 98 Pac. at 45.
The reasoning of the court seems weak. It would be
hard to find an area in a large city (in this case, Los
Angeles, California) in which crimes had not been
committed. It certainly is not unusual for people to be
on the street at late hours and the plaintiff's refusal to
answer could hardly have been original justification
for the policeman's questions.
23 "There is, of course, nothing unreasonable in an
officer's questioning persons outdoors at night ... and
it is possible that in some circumstances even a refusal
to answer would, in the light of other evidence, justify
an arrest.., and in some circumstances an officer mak-
ing such an inquiry might be justified in running his
hands over a person's clothing to protect himself from
an attack with a hidden weapon .... YPeople v. Simon,
45 Cal.2d 645, 290 P.2d 531, 534 (1955); "That the
officers had a right to stop and question plaintiff in
error and his companion cannot be doubted ....
People v. Henneman, 367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E.2d 649
(1937). Some states have conferred this power to ques-
into upon the police by statute.
24 justice Jackson once remarked that issues which
bring the mobs out into the streets in other countries
bring the lawyers into the courts in this country.
[Vol. 49
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mitted in this country today.25 However, if the
interests of society may be more legitimate in this
area, the rights of the citizen weigh more heavily
against restrictions here. The freedom to travel
from place to place is a constitutional right.26
Tramps and teen-agers are citizens, too,27 and it
would seem to be hard to draw legislation which
would ensnare the pervert but ignore the spectator
at a children's baseball game, control the prowling
vagrant but exempt the respectable citizen out for
an evening stroll, catch the nighttime juvenile
thief but leave untouched the student coming
home from the library. In short, the courts have
been hard put when liberty conflicts with well-
meant restrictions enacted by the legislature in
this area.
We may start with the dictum of Judge Ross in
Norristown v. Moyer.2 "... [T]he infamous habit
of corner lounging," the judge declared, "is il-
legal." This case, and a later Pennsylvania de-
cision,21 mark the outer limits of a line of cases
which declare that while citizens possess the right
to move from place to place on the public highway,
no stoppage, other than that required by business
or necessity, is to be tolerated.
The ordinance involved in City of St. Lous v.
Gloner30 forbade standing, loafing, or lounging on
street corners or other public places. Its applica-
tion to peaceful picketing was rejected as "un-
reasonable and oppressive"-the court declaring
broadly that one had the right to "stop and remain
upon the corner of any street that he might desire,
so long as he conducted himself in a decent and
orderly manner, disturbing no one, nor interfering
with anyone's right to the use of the streets.""
Ex Parte Strittmater,32 upheld an ordinance which
prohibited "able-bodied" persons from "habitu-
ally" loafing "for the larger portion of their time"
without any regular employment, while the court
in Territory of Hawaii v. And-uha,7 took "judicial
25 FBI, 28 UNwroRm CRIE REPORTS 113 (1957).
20 Kent v. Ddles, supra note 5.
27".. . the boy or girl... have the same rights of
ingress or egress that citizens of mature years enjoy."
Ex parte McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936,
937 (1898). Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
: 67 Pa. 355 (1871).
29 Commonwealth v. Challis, 8 Pa. Super. 130 (1898).
30 210 Mo. 502, 109 S.W. 30 (1908).31 Id. at 109 S.W. 32. City of Olathe v. Lauck, 156
Kan. 637, 135 P.2d 549 (1943). (Jehovah's Witnesses
who were busily passing out literature on a street
comer were not violating ordinance prohibiting persons
from "loitering on any public street... who shall fail
or refuse promptly to move on when notified so to do.")
m 58 Tex. Crim. 156, 124 S.W. 906 (1910).
48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931).
cognizance" of the fact that "the majority of man-
kind spend a goodly part of their waking hours in
whiling or idling the time away" and voided a
loitering statute."
This conflict in the cases is by no means limited
to the pronouncements of courts of different juris-
dictions. A lawyer talking quietly with a group of
friends outside a restaurant was convicted of dis-
orderly conduct when he refused to "move on"
after being warned by the police in People v. Gal-
pern15 But twenty-six years later the same court
voided the conviction of a Puerto Rican laborer
who refused to "move on" while talking, along
with thirteen other persons, to a social worker on
a public street. Even though the words "lounge"
and "loiter" were held by the court to have a-com-
mon and accepted meaning, in People v. Diaz,3 a
statute which did not further detail the unlawful
conduct was held to be unconstitutionally vague.
If the foregoing decisions furnish little or no
guidance for the legislature, another line of cases
may point the way. State v. Starre7 upheld an
ordinance branding as a vagrant any person who
loitered on the grounds or within 300 feet of a
school "without legitimate reason therefore".
Since the school grounds were not free to anyone
"like a public street or highway or public park"
the legislature might constitutionally draw the
line about such institutions. Since the burden
would be on the state to prove that a legitimate
reason was lacking, there would be little possibility
34People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App.2d 862, 161 P.2d
498 (1945), upheld an ordinance which prohibited
loitering on the streets after 9:00 P.M. by persons
under 18 years of age. Loosely drawn statutes often ban
"wandering" on the streets after certain hours. For
example, Ch. 38, § 103 ILL. REv. STAT. (1957), defines
a delinquent child as one who, among other things,
"wanders about the streets in the nightime without
being on any lawful business or occupation." The cases
indicate, however, that such statutes may be easily
avoided by persons pursuing reasonably definite paths
between two certain points, and it seems highly un-
likely that the state could ever prove that the defendant
was headed for other than a specific destination. Rain-
bolt v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 164, 260 P.2d 426 (1953);
State v. Grenz, 26 Wash.2d 764, 175 P.2d 633 (1946);
Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 Fed. 93 (9th Cir. 1916). The
last case upheld an ordinance which forbade "those
who are without occupation or property" to wander
about the streets of the city after 11:00 P.M. The
ordinance could be avoided by pursuing a straight and
certain path between certain points, the court seems
to indicate, but it is also very doubtful that it could
constitutionally apply only to persons "without occupa-
tion or property" in the light of Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160 (1941).35 259 N.Y. 279, 181 N.E. 572 (1932).
36 4 N.Y.2d 469, 151 N.E.2d 871 (1958).
d7 57 Ariz. 270, 113 P.2d 356 (1941).
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of abuse in practice. Similarly, the New York
courts upheld an ordinance prohibiting loitering
about any toilet, station or station platform of a
subway or elevated railway or railroad without a
satisfactory explanation of the person's presence.n
The court's construction of the ordinance excluded
those who came to the station to take trains, buy
tickets or magazines, see persons off, use the bath-
rooms, "those who are guilty of mere lassitude or
indolence, those overcome by a normal weariness
and... students of human nature who use station
waiting rooms as their laboratory." It was aimed,
instead, at "dirty, besotted people," "furtive
homosexuals or degenerates" or the "boisterous
noisy cut-ups." Moreover, the burden of proof
placed on the state meant that all legitimate rea-
sons had to be excluded by the state's evidence or
the prosecution would fail.
Recent legal commentaries have indicated that
curfew laws have been upheld in a variety of cir-
cumstances, 9 but a search of the reports discloses
only one case in which a curfew law40 has been
held to be constitutionally permissible. This is
Hirabayashi v. United States,4' in which the United
States Supreme Court held that a curfew imposed
immediately after Pearl Harbor on the large group
of Japanese people living in a military area on the
west coast was a vital and necessary exercise of the
war power. But even as to this the court did some
hedging. 2
In Mayor of Memphis v. Winfield,4 3 apparently
the first judicial consideration of the validity of a
curfew ordinance by an American appellate court,
's People v. Bell, 125 N.Y.S.2d 117, affirmed, 306
N.Y. 110, 115 N.E.2d 821 (1953).
9 See Note, 12 U. MIAM L. Rav. 257 (1957). Cases
cited in this Note in support of the view that curfews
have been upheld are mostly loitering, wandering or
unlawful Purpose cases.
40 As distinguished from a loitering, wandering, or
unlawful purpose law.
4' 320 U.S. 81 (1943). There is also Dunn v. Common-
wealth, 105 Ky. 834, 49 S.W. 813 (1899), which upheld
a curfew aimed at prostitutes who could not be on the
streets after 7:00 P.M. except in cases of "reasonable
necessity." The reasoning of the case is weak and its
validity seems doubtful.
2 ". . [W]e decide only that the curfew order as
applied, and at the time it was applied, was within the
boundaries of the war power." 320 U.S. at 102 (Em-
phasis added.) ". . . I think that the military arm, con-
fronted with the peril of imminent enemy attack and
acting under the authority conferred by the Congress
made an allowable judgment at the time the curfew
restriction was imposed. Whether such a restriction is
valid today (the war was still in progress) is another
matter." 320 U.S. at 113 (concurring opinion) (Empha-
sis added.)
43 27 Tenn. 707 (1848).
a curfew which provided that "free Negroes"
could not be on the streets of the city after 10:00
P.M. was held unconstitutional, not on the ground
of a denial of equal protection, but because curfew
laws were "high handed and oppressive"-an
attempt to "impair the liberty of a free person."
Portland, Oregon had what was apparently a
straight curfew ordinance. It provided that:
"Between the hours of 1:00 and 5:00 o'clock A.M.,
Pacific Standard time, it shall be unlawful for any
person to roam or be upon any street, alley or public
place without having and disclosing a lawful pur-
pose." When the ordinance was challenged, in
City of Portland v. Goodwin," the court adopted a
construction which virtually eliminated all conduct
from its reach. The court was unable to conceive
of a situation where a "sane" person could be upon
the street without "some purpose." 45 Secondly, the
court declared that the words "without having...
a lawful purpose" were the exact equivalent of
"having an unlawful purpose"; and that a person
who went upon the street "as an innocent man"
was not required to take "affirmative action to
demonstrate his innocence," unless "his voluntary
conduct overcomes the apparent and presumed
innocence of his movements by disclosing a purpose
to violate some law other than the ordinance in ques-
tion." (Emphasis added.) It is submitted that the
court's construction of the law virtually demolishes
it and that the case is no authority for the principle
that a valid curfew law may be enacted.
Juvenile curfew laws have been adopted by a
great many municipalities in an effort to control
juvenile crime;46 but no juvenile curfew law has
successfully withstood a constitutional challenge in an
American appellate court.47
The ordinance in Ex Parte McCarver,43 prohibited
persons under 21 years of age from being on the
street after 9:00 P.M. unless (1) accompanied by
a parent or guardian, or (2) in search of a doctor.
Such legislation, declared the court, was paternal-
istic, an invasion of the minor's personal liberty
44187 Ore. 409, 210 P.2d 577 (1949).
45 A sleepwalker might come within the prohibition
of the ordinance. In any event, the court refused to
speculate on who might qualify-"we will not pass
upon that question until some purposeless person
raises it." 187 Ore. at 419.
46 Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 66, 68-9 (1958).
47 People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App.2d 862, 161 P.
2d 498, 501 (1945), is often cited as a case in which ajuvenile curfew was upheld, but it is apparent that
only a "loitering" law was in issue there.
4839 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898).
[Vol. 49
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which made "the tolling of the curfew bell equiva-
lent to the drum taps of the camp."
Fifty-nine years elapsed before another appellate
court had occasion to consider the validity of a
juvenile curfew ordinance. In Alves v. Justice
Court of Chico Judicial District,4 the appellant
sought a writ of prohibition to prevent his prose-
cution under a curfew ordinance 0 He was charged
with aiding a minor who, though married and
emancipated from the control of his parents, fell
within the curfew's prohibitions. The court con-
ceded that the purpose of the ordinance was quite
clearly the control of nocturnal juvenile crime. But
because the strictures of the act went beyond the
juvenile criminal, and virtually proscribed all
other nighttime juvenile activity, which would be,
in the absence of the curfew, innocent or perhaps
even laudable, it was held unconstitutional as an
arbitrary invasion of the personal liberties of the
citizen. 51
The juvenile curfew laws, perhaps more than
any of the others which have been discussed in
this Comment, bring the conflict between law and
individual rights more sharply into focus. It seems
entirely logical to assume that juveniles who are
under a legal compulsion to stay off the streets
after certain hours will not be able to commit
crimes at that time, and that the law's sanction
will be effective where the parent's sanction is not.
If the legislature may reasonably make these
policy judgments, courts will be hard put to void
their implementation in the form of curfew laws.
There is little evidence, however, to support the
view that such policy presumptions are valid.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania has a juvenile curfew
ordinance which is relatively well enforced.4 A
4 148 Cal. App.2d 419, 306 P.2d 601 (1957).50 (a) It shall be unlawful for any minor under the
age of seventeen years of age to be in or on any public
street, park, square or any public place between the
hours of 10:00 o'clock P.M. and 5:00 o'clock A.M. of
the following day, except when and where said minor is
accompanied by a parent or legal guardian having the
care and custody of said minor, or where the presence
of said minor in said place or places is connected with,
and required by, some legitimate business, trade, pro-
fession or occupation in which said minor is engaged.
(b) Any person assisting, aiding... any minor... to
violate... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. ... "
51 "... [T]he general right of every person to engage
in lawful and innocent activity while subject to reason-
able restriction cannot be taken away under the guise
of police regulation." 306 P.2d at 605. Note, 107 U.
PA. L. REv. 66 (1958), reports that a juvenile curfew
was voided in Riley v. City of Miami, Chancery No.
198087, Cir. Ct. of 11th Cir. of Fla., April 5, 1957.
52Note, Curfew Ordinances And The Control Of
Juvenile Nocturnal Crime, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 66, 83-86
comprehensive survey which undertook to estab-
lish the effect of the ordinance on the juvenile
crime rate reported "an accurate determination of
the effectiveness of the curfew in achieving its
objective is, as a practical matter, impossible to
ascertain" and that "the only reasonable conclu-
sion is that there is no certainty that curfew en-
forcement reduces juvenile crime."" Moreover,
police and juvenile officials who are in perhaps the
best position to gauge the effectiveness of juvenile
curfews are by no means agreed on their efficacy. 4
Opponents of juvenile curfew laws mount their
heaviest attack on the constitutional validity of
such regulations. They have been characterized by
the case law as arbitrary and unreasonable restric-
tions which, while seeking to control the juvenile
criminal, actually ensnare only the juvenile whose
otherwise innocent nighttime activities, committed
openly, bring him to the attention of the police.
And various commentators have rejected the
enactment of curfew laws as "panaceas" and as
"shotgun" approachs which have been utilized as
a last resort by a community bankrupt in con-
structive juvenile legislation.
Too little has been said by those concerned with
this problem55 about another equally serious consti-
tutional objection-that the curfew laws unreason-
ably usurp the parental function. Many years ago,
the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a juvenile
delinquency statute on this ground. The statute in
People ex rel O'Connell v. Turner56 authorized the -
commitment to a reform school of any juveniles
between the ages of six and sixteen "who are
destitute of proper parental care, and growing up
in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness or vice." The
court, writing in absolute terms, held that: "The
parent has the right to the care, custody and
(1958). The ordinance is of the "loitering" type, but it
appears that the police and the courts enforce it as a
curfew.
53Id. at 96.
m The University of Pennsylvania Law Review
survey notes that police officials in Portland, Oregon
and Duluth, Minnesota took opposite stands on this
question. Questioned by this author, the Hon. Joseph
Lohman, former sheriff of Cook County, of Cook
County, Illinois (which includes Chicago and suburban
towns having juvenile curfews) and an expert in the
field of juvenile delinquency, characterized juvenile
curfews as "silly" and pointed out that they only served
to create resentment of police conduct in teen-agers.55 Recent Decisions, 55 Micr. L. Rzv. 1026 (1957);
Note, 12 U. MTAr L. Rxv. 257 (1957); Note, 32 TuL.
L. REv. 117 (1957); Note, 37 NEB. L. REv. 479 (1958);
Iote, 6 KAN. L. RFv. 377 (1958).
56 55 fll. 280 (1870).
19.591
